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Abstract— The distributed source coding problem is considered
when the sensors, or encoders, are under Byzantine attack;
that is, an unknown group of sensors have been reprogrammed
by a malicious intruder to undermine the reconstruction at
the fusion center. Three different forms of the problem are
considered. The first is a variable-rate setup, in which the decoder
adaptively chooses the rates at which the sensors transmit.
An explicit characterization of the variable-rate achievable sum
rates is given for any number of sensors and any groups of
traitors. The converse is proved constructively by letting the
traitors simulate a fake distribution and report the generated
values as the true ones. This fake distribution is chosen so that
the decoder cannot determine which sensors are traitors while
maximizing the required rate to decode every value. Achievability
is proved using a scheme in which the decoder receives small
packets of information from a sensor until its message can be
decoded, before moving on to the next sensor. The sensors use
randomization to choose from a set of coding functions, which
makes it probabilistically impossible for the traitors to cause
the decoder to make an error. Two forms of the fixed-rate
problem are considered, one with deterministic coding and one
with randomized coding. The achievable rate regions are given
for both these problems, and it is shown that lower rates can be
achieved with randomized coding.
Index Terms— Distributed Source Coding. Byzantine Attack.
Sensor Fusion. Network Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
WE consider a modification to the distributed sourcecoding problem in which an unknown subset of sensors
are taken over by a malicious intruder and reprogrammed.
We assume there are m sensors. Each time slot, sensors i
for i = 1, · · · ,m observe random variables Xi according
to the joint probability distribution p(x1 · · ·xm). Each sensor
encodes its observation independently and transmits a message
to a common decoder, which attempts to reconstruct the
source values with small probability of error based on those
messages. A subset of sensors are traitors, while the rest are
honest. Unbeknownst to the honest sensors or the decoder, the
traitors have been reprogrammed to cooperate to obstruct the
goal of the network, launching a so-called Byzantine attack.
To counter this attack, the honest sensors and decoder must
employ strategies so that the decoder can correctly reconstruct
source values no matter what the traitors do.
It is obvious that observations made by the traitors are
irretrievable unless the traitors choose to deliver them to the
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decoder. Thus the best the decoder can hope to achieve is to
reconstruct the observations of the honest sensors. A simple
procedure is to ignore the statistical correlations among the
observations and collect data from each sensor individually.
The total sum rate of such an approach is
∑
iH(Xi). One
expects however that this sum rate can be lowered if the
correlation structure is not ignored.
Without traitors, Slepian-Wolf coding [1] can be used to
achieve a sum rate as low as
H(X1 · · ·Xm). (1)
However, standard Slepian-Wolf coding has no mechanism for
handling any deviations from the agreed-upon encoding func-
tions by the sensors. Even a random fault by a single sensor
could have devastating consequences for the accuracy of the
source estimates produced at the decoder, to say nothing of
a Byzantine attack on multiple sensors. In particular, because
Slepian-Wolf coding takes advantage of the correlation among
sources, manipulating the codeword for one source can alter
the accuracy of the decoder’s estimate for other sources. It will
turn out that for most source distributions, the sum rate given
in (1) cannot be achieved if there is even a single traitor.
In this paper, we are interested in the lowest achievable sum-
rate such that the decoder can reconstruct observations of the
honest sensors with arbitrarily small error probability. In some
cases, we are also interested in the rate region. We note that
although the problem setup does not allow the detector to dis-
tinguish traitors from the honest sensors, an efficient scheme
that guarantees the reconstruction of data from honest sensors
is of both theoretical and practical interest. For example, for
a distributed inference problem in the presence of Byzantine
sensors, a practical (though not necessarily optimal) solution is
to attack the problem in two separate phases . In the first phase,
the decoder collects data from sensors over multiple access
channels with rate constraints. Here we require that data from
honest sensors are perfectly reconstructed at the decoder even
though the decoder does not know which piece of data is from
an honest sensor. In the second step, the received data is used
for statistical inference. The example of distributed detection
in the presence of Byzantine sensors is considered in [2].
The decoder may also have other side information about the
content of the messages that allows the decoder to distinguish
messages from the honest sensors.
A. Related Work
The notion of Byzantine attack has its root in the Byzantine
generals problem [3], [4] in which a clique of traitorous
2generals conspire to prevent loyal generals from forming
consensus. It was shown in [3] that consensus in the presence
of Byzantine attack is possible if and only if less than a third
of the generals are traitors.
Countering Byzantine attacks in communication networks
has also been studied in the past by many authors. See the
earlier work of Perlman [5] and also more recent review
[6], [7]. An information theoretic network coding approach
to Byzantine attack is presented in [8]. In [9], Awerbuch
et al suggest a method for mitigating Byzantine attacks on
routing in ad hoc networks. Their approach is most similar
to ours in the way they maintain a list of current knowledge
about which links are trustworthy, constantly updated based
on new information. Sensor fusion with Byzantine sensors
was studied in [10]. In that paper, the sensors, having already
agreed upon a message, communicate it to the fusion center
over a discrete memoryless channel. Quite similar results were
shown in [11], in which a malicious intruder takes control
of a set of links in the network. The authors show that two
nodes can communicate at a nonzero rate as long as less
than half of the links between them are Byzantine. This is
different from the current paper in that the transmitter chooses
its messages, instead of relaying information received from an
outside source, but some of the same approaches from [11] are
used in the current paper, particularly the use of randomization
to fool traitors that have already transmitted.
B. Redefining Achievable Rate
The nature of Byzantine attack require three modifications
to the usual notion of achievable rate. The first, as mentioned
above, is that small probability of error is required only for
honest sources, even though the decoder may not know which
sources are honest. This requirement is reminiscent of [3],
in which the lieutenants need only perform the commander’s
order if the commander is not a traitor, even though the
lieutenants might not be able to decide this with certainty.
The next modification is that there must be small probability
of error no matter what the traitors do. This is essentially the
definition of Byzantine attack.
The final modification has to do with which sensors are
allowed to be traitors. Let H be the set of honest sensors, and
T = {1, · · · ,m}\H the set of traitors. Any code is associated
with a list of which sets of sensors it can handle as the set
of traitors. A rate is then achieved if the code gets small
probability of error when the actual set of traitors is in fact on
the list. It will be more convenient to specify not the list of
allowable sets of traitors, but rather the list of allowable sets of
honest sensors. We define H ⊂ 2{1,··· ,m} to be this list. Thus
small probability of error is required only when H ∈ H . One
special case is when the code can handle any group of at most
t traitors. That is,
H = Ht , {S ⊂ {1, · · · ,m} : |S| ≥ m− t}.
Observe that achievable rates depend not just on the true set
of traitors but also on the collection H , because the decoder’s
willingness to accept more and more different groups of
traitors allows the true traitors to get away with more without
being detected. Thus we see a trade off between rate and
security—in order to handle more traitors, one needs to be
willing to accept a higher rate.
C. Fixed-Rate Versus Variable-Rate Coding
In standard source coding, an encoder is made up of a
single encoding function. We will show that this fixed-rate
setup is suboptimal for this problem, in the sense that we
can achieve lower sum rates using variable-rate coding. By
variable-rate we mean that the number of bits transmitted
per source value by a particular sensor will not be fixed.
Instead, the decoder chooses the rates at “run time” in the
following way. Each sensor has a finite number of encoding
functions, all of them fixed beforehand, but with potentially
different output alphabets. The coding session is then made up
of a number of transactions. Each transaction begins with the
decoder deciding which sensor will transmit, and which of its
several encoding functions it will use. The sensor then executes
the chosen encoding function and transmits the output back to
the decoder. Finally, the decoder uses the received message to
choose the next sensor and encoding function, beginning the
next transaction, and so on. Thus a code is made up of a set of
encoding functions for each sensor, a method for the decoder
to choose sensors and encoding functions based on previously
received messages, and lastly a decoding function that takes
all received messages and produces source estimates.
Note that the decoder has the ability to transmit some
information back to the sensors, but this feedback is limited to
the choice of encoding function. Since the number of encoding
functions need not grow with the block length, this represents
zero rate feedback.
In variable-rate coding, since the rates are only decided
upon during the coding session, there is no notion of an m-
dimensional achievable rate region. Instead, we only discuss
achievable sum rates.
D. Traitor Capabilities
An important consideration with Byzantine attack is the
information to which the traitors have access. First, we assume
that the traitors have complete knowledge of the coding
scheme used by the decoder and honest sensors. Furthermore,
we always assume that they can communicate with each
other arbitrarily. For variable-rate coding, they may have any
amount of ability to eavesdrop on transmissions between
honest sensors and the decoder. We will show that this ability
has no effect on achievable rates. We assume with fixed-rate
coding that all sensors transmit simultaneously, so it does not
make sense that traitors could eavesdrop on honest sensors’
transmissions before making their own, as that would violate
causality. Thus we assume for fixed-rate coding that the traitors
cannot eavesdrop.
The key factor, however, is the extent to which the traitors
have direct access to information about the sources. We assume
the most general memoryless case, that the traitors have access
to the random variable W , where W is i.i.d. distributed
with (X1 · · ·Xm) according to the conditional distribution
r(w|x1 · · ·xm). A natural assumption would be that W always
3includes Xi for traitors i, but in fact this need not be the case.
An important special case is where W = (X1, · · · , Xm), i.e.
the traitors have perfect information.
We assume that the distribution of W depends on who
the traitors are, and that the decoder may not know exactly
what this distribution is. Thus each code is associated with a
function R that maps elements of H to sets of conditional
distributions r. The relationship between r and R(H) is
analogous to the relationship between H and H . That is, given
H, the code is willing to accept all distributions r ∈ R(H).
Therefore a code is designed based on H and R, and then
the achieved rate depends at run time on H and r, where
we assume H ∈ H and r ∈ R(H). We therefore discuss
not achievable rates R but rather achievable rate functions
R(H, r). In fact, this applies only to variable-rate codes. In
the fixed-rate case, no run time rate decisions can be made,
so achievable rates depend only on H and R.
E. Main Results
The main results of this paper give explicit characterizations
of the achievable rates for three different setups. The first,
which is discussed in the most depth, is the variable-rate
case, for which we characterize achievable sum rate functions.
The other two setups are for fixed-rate coding, divided into
deterministic and randomized coding, for which we give m-
dimensional achievable rate regions. We show that randomized
coding yields a larger achievable rate region than deterministic
coding, but we believe that in most cases randomized fixed-
rate coding requires an unrealistic assumption. In addition,
even randomized fixed-rate coding cannot achieve the same
sum rates as variable-rate coding.
We give the exact solutions in Theorems 1 and 2, but
describe here the intuition behind them. For variable-rate,
the achievable rates are based on alternate distributions on
(X1 · · ·Xm). Specifically, given W , the traitors can simulate
any distribution q¯(xT |w) to produce a fraudulent version of
XnT , then report this sequence as the truth. Suppose that the
overall distribution q(x1 · · ·xm) governing the combination
of the true value of XnH with this fake value of XnT could
be produced in several different ways, with several different
sets of traitors. In that case, the decoder cannot tell which
of these several possibilities is the truth, which means that
from its point of view, any sensor that is honest in one
of these possibilities may in fact be honest. Since the error
requirement described in I-B stipulates that the decoder must
produce a correct estimate for every honest sensor, it must
attempt to decode the source values associated with all these
potentially honest sensors. Thus the sum rate must be at least
the joint entropy, when distributed according to q, of the
sources associated with all potentially honest sensors. The
supremum over all such q¯s is the achievable sum rate.
For example, suppose H = Hm−1. That is, at most one
sensor is honest. Then the traitors are able to create the
distribution q(x1 · · ·xm) = p(x1) · · · p(xm) no matter what
group of m − 1 sensors are the traitors. Thus every sensor
appears as if it could be the honest one, so the minimum
achievable sum rate is
H(X1) + · · ·+H(Xm). (2)
In other words, the decoder must use an independent source
code for each sensor, which requires receiving nH(Xi) bits
from sensor i for all i.
The achievable fixed-rate regions are based on the Slepian-
Wolf achievable rate region. For randomized fixed-rate coding,
the achievable region is such that for all S ∈ H , the rates
associated with the sensors in S fall into the Slepian-Wolf
rate region on the corresponding random variables. Note that
for H = {{1, · · · ,m}}, this is identical to the Slepian-Wolf
region. For H = Hm−1, this region is such that for all i,
Ri ≥ H(Xi), which corresponds to the sum rate in (2). The
deterministic fixed-rate achievable region is a subset of that of
randomized fixed-rate, but with an additional constraint stated
in Section VI.
F. Randomization
Randomization plays a key role in defeating Byzantine
attacks. As we have discussed, allowing randomized encoding
in the fixed-rate situation expands the achievable region. In ad-
dition, the variable-rate coding scheme that we propose relies
heavily on randomization to achieve small probability of error.
In both fixed and variable-rate coding, randomization is used
as follows. Every time a sensor transmits, it randomly chooses
from a group of essentially identical encoding functions. The
index of the chosen function is transmitted to the decoder
along with its output. Without this randomization, a traitor
that transmits before an honest sensor i would know exactly
the messages that sensor i will send. In particular, it would be
able to find fake sequences for sensor i that would produce
those same messages. If the traitor tailors the messages it
sends to the decoder to match one of those fake sequences,
when sensor i then transmits, it would appear to corroborate
this fake sequence, causing an error. By randomizing the
choice of encoding function, the set of sequences producing
the same message is not fixed, so a traitor can no longer
know with certainty that a particular fake source sequence
will result in the same messages by sensor i as the true
one. This is not unlike Wyner’s wiretap channel [12], in
which information is kept from the wiretapper by introducing
additional randomness. See in particular Section V-D for the
proof that variable-rate randomness can defeat the traitors in
this manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we develop in detail the case that there are three sensors
and one traitor, describing a coding scheme that achieves
the optimum sum rate. In Section III, we formally give the
variable-rate model and present the variable-rate result. In
Section IV, we discuss the variable-rate achievable rate region
and give an analytic formulation for the minimum achievable
sum rate for some special cases. In Section VI, we give
the fixed-rate models and present the fixed-rate result. In
Sections V and VII, we prove the variable-rate and fixed-rate
results respectively. Finally, in Section VIII, we conclude.
4II. THREE SENSOR EXAMPLE
A. Potential Traitor Techniques
For simplicity and motivation, we first explore the three-
sensor case with one traitor. That is, m = 3 and
H = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}}.
Suppose also that the traitor has access to perfect information.
Consider first the simple case where the Xi can be decom-
posed as
X1 = (Y1, Y12, Y13, Y123),
X2 = (Y2, Y12, Y23, Y123),
X3 = (Y3, Y13, Y23, Y123)
where Y1, Y2, Y3, Y12, Y13, Y23, Y123 are independent. Suppose
the traitor is sensor 3. It can generate a new, indepen-
dent version of Y23, call it Y ′23, and then form X ′3 =
(Y1, Y13, Y
′
23, Y123). We claim that if sensor 3 now behaves for
the rest of the coding session as if this counterfeit X ′3 were the
real value, then the decoder will not be able to determine the
traitor’s identity. This is because both (X1, X2) and (X2, X ′3)
look like they could be a true pair, since all information that
they share matches. Thus the decoder cannot know which of
sensors 1 or 3 is the traitor, and which of Y23 or Y ′23 is the
truth, so it must obtain estimates of them both. To construct
estimates of all three variables, every piece except Y23 must be
received only once, but the two versions Y23 must be received
separately. Therefore the sum rate must be at least
H(X1X2X3) +H(Y23) = H(X1X2X3) + I(X2;X3|X1).
(3)
In fact, this last expression holds for general distributions as
well, as we demonstrate next.
Now take any distribution p, again with sensor 3 as the
traitor. Sensors 1 and 2 will behave honestly, so they will
report X1 and X2 correctly, as distributed according to the
marginal distribution p(x1x2). Since sensor 3 has access to the
exact values of X1 and X2, it may simulate the conditional
distribution p(x3|x2), then take the resulting X3 sequence
and report it as the truth. Effectively, then, the three random
variables will be distributed according to the distribution
q(x1x2x3) , p(x1x2)p(x3|x2).
The decoder will be able to determine that sensors 1 and 2 are
reporting jointly typical sequences, as are sensors 2 and 3, but
not sensors 1 and 3. Therefore, it can tell that either sensor 1 or
3 is the traitor, but not which one, so it must obtain estimates
of the sources from all three sensors. Since the three streams
are not jointly typical with respect to the source distribution
p(x1x2x3), standard Slepian-Wolf coding on three encoders
will not correctly decode them all. However, had we known
the strategy of the traitor, we could do Slepian-Wolf coding
with respect to the distribution q. This will take a sum rate of
Hq(X1X2X3) = H(X1X2X3) + I(X1;X3|X2)
where Hq is the entropy with respect to q. In fact we will not
do Slepian-Wolf coding with respect to q but rather something
slightly different that gives the same rate. Observe that this
matches (3). Since Slepian-Wolf coding without traitors can
achieve a sum rate of H(X1X2X3), we have paid a penalty
of I(X1;X3|X2) for the single traitor.
We supposed that sensor 3 simulated the distribution
p(x3|x2). It could have just as easily simulated p(x3|x1),
or another sensor could have been the traitor. Hence, the
minimum achievable sum rate for all H ∈ H is at least
R∗ , H(X1X2X3) + max{I(X1;X2|X3),
I(X1;X3|X2), I(X2;X3|X1)}. (4)
In fact, this is exactly the minimum achievable sum rate, as
shown below.
B. Variable-Rate Coding Scheme
We now give a variable-rate coding scheme that achieves
R∗. This scheme is somewhat different from the one we
present for the general case in Section V, but it is much
simpler, and it illustrates the basic idea. The procedure will be
made up of a number of rounds. Communication from sensor
i in the first round will be based solely on the first n values of
Xi, in the second round on the second n values of Xi, and so
on. The principle advantage of the round structure is that the
decoder may hold onto information that is carried over from
one round to the next.
In particular, the decoder maintains a collection V ⊂ H
representing the sets that could be the set of honest sensors.
If a sensor is completely eliminated from V , that means it
has been identified as the traitor. We begin with V = H , and
then remove a set from V whenever we find that the messages
from the corresponding pair of sensors are not jointly typical.
With high probability, the two honest sensors report jointly
typical sequences, so we expect never to eliminate the honest
pair from V . If the traitor employs the q discussed above, for
example, we would expect sensors 1 and 3 to report atypical
sequences, so we will drop {1, 3} from V . In essence, the
value of V contains our current knowledge about what the
traitor is doing.
The procedure for a round is as follows. If V contains
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}}, do the following:
1) Receive nH(X1) bits from sensor 1 and decode xn1 .
2) Receive nH(X2|X1) bits from sensor 2. If there is a
sequence in Xn2 jointly typical with xn1 that matches this
transmission, decode that sequence to xn2 . If not, receive
nI(X1;X2) additional bits from sensor 2, decode xn2 ,
and remove {1, 2} from V .
3) Do the same with sensor 3: Receive nH(X3|X1) bits
and decode xn3 if possible. If not, receive nI(X1;X3)
additional bits, decode, and remove {1, 3} from V .
If V is one of the other two subsets of H with two
elements, perform the same procedure but replace sensor 1
with whichever sensor appears in both elements in V . If V
contains just one element, then we have exactly identified the
traitor, so ignore the sensor that does not appear and simply
do Slepian-Wolf coding on the two remaining sensors.
Note that the only cases when the number of bits transmitted
exceeds nR∗ are when we receive a second message from one
5of the sensors, which happens exactly when we eliminate an
element from V . Assuming the source sequences of the two
honest sensors are jointly typical, this can occur at most twice,
so we can always achieve a sum rate of R∗ when averaged
over enough rounds.
C. Fixed-Rate Coding Scheme
In the procedure described above, the number of bits sent
by a sensor changes from round to round. We can no longer do
this with fixed-rate coding, so we need a different approach.
Suppose sensor 3 is the traitor. It could perform a black hole
attack, in which case the estimates for Xn1 and Xn2 must be
based only on the messages from sensors 1 and 2. Thus, the
rates R1 and R2 must fall into the Slepian-Wolf achievability
region for X1 and X2. Similarly, if one of the other sensors
was the traitor, the other pairs of rates also must fall into the
corresponding Slepian-Wolf region. Putting these conditions
together gives
R1 ≥ max{H(X1|X2), H(X1|X3)}
R2 ≥ max{H(X2|X1), H(X2|X3)}
R3 ≥ max{H(X3|X1), H(X3|X2)}
R1 +R2 ≥ H(X1X2)
R1 +R3 ≥ H(X1X3)
R2 +R3 ≥ H(X2X3).
(5)
If the rates fall into this region, we can do three simultaneous
Slepian-Wolf codes, one on each pair of sensors, thereby
constructing two estimates for each sensor. If we randomize
these codes using the method described in Section I-F, the
traitor will be forced either to report the true message, or report
a false message, which with high probability will be detected
as such. Thus either the two estimates for each sensor will
be the same, in which case we know both are correct, or one
of the estimates will be demonstrably false, in which case the
other is correct.
We now show that the region given by (5) does not include
sum rates as low as R∗. Assume without loss of generality
that I(X1;X2|X3) achieves the maximum in (4). Summing
the last three conditions in (5) gives
R1 +R2 +R3 ≥
1
2
(
H(X1X2) +H(X1X3) +H(X2X3)
)
= H(X1X2X3) +
1
2
(
I(X1;X2|X3) + I(X1X2;X3)
)
. (6)
If I(X1X2;X3) > I(X1;X2|X3), (6) is larger than (4).
Hence, there exist source distributions for which we cannot
achieve the same sum rates with even randomized fixed-rate
coding as with variable-rate coding.
If we are interested only in deterministic codes, the region
given by (5) can no longer be achieved. In fact, we will prove
in Section VII that the achievable region reduces to the trivially
achievable region where Ri ≥ H(Xi) for all i when m = 3,
though it is nontrivial for m > 3. For example, suppose m = 4
and H = H1. In this case, the achievable region is similar
to that given by (5), but with an additional sensor. That is,
each of the 6 pairs of rates must fall into the corresponding
Slepian-Wolf region. In this case, we do three simultaneous
Slepian-Wolf codes for each sensor, construct three estimates,
each associated with one of the other sensors. For an honest
sensor, only one of the other sensors could be a traitor, so at
least two of these estimates must be correct. Thus we need
only take the plurality of the three estimates to obtain the
correct estimate.
III. VARIABLE-RATE MODEL AND RESULT
A. Notation
Let Xi be the random variable revealed to sensor i, Xi the
alphabet of that variable, and xi a corresponding realization.
A sequence of random variables revealed to sensor i over n
timeslots is denoted Xni , and a realization of it xni ∈ Xni . Let
M , {1, · · · ,m}. For a set S ⊂ M, let XS be the set of
random variables {Xi}i∈S, and define xS and XS similarly.
By Sc we mean M\S. Let T nǫ (XS)[q] be the strongly typical
set with respect to the distribution q, or the source distribution
p if unspecified. Similarly, Hq(XS) is the entropy with respect
to the distribution q, or p if unspecified.
B. Communication Protocol
The transmission protocol is composed of L transactions.
In each transaction, the decoder selects a sensor to receive
information from and selects which of K encoding functions
it should use. The sensor then responds by executing that
encoding function and transmitting its output back to the
decoder, which then uses the new information to begin the
next transaction.
For each sensor i ∈ M and encoding function j ∈
{1, · · · ,K}, there is an associated rate Ri,j . On the lth
transaction, let il be the sensor and jl the encoding function
chosen by the decoder, and let hl be the number of l′ ∈
{1, · · · , l − 1} such that il′ = il. That is, hl is the number
of times il has transmitted prior to the lth transaction. Note
that il, jl, hl are random variables, since they are chosen by
the decoder based on messages it has received, which depend
on the source values. The jth encoding function for sensor i
is given by
fi,j : X
n
i × Z× {1, · · · ,K}
hl → {1, · · · , 2nRi,j} (7)
where Z represents randomness generated at the sensor. Let
Il ∈ {1, · · · , 2
nRil,jl } be the message received by the
decoder in the lth transaction. If il is honest, then Il =
fil,jl(X
n
il
, ρil , Jl), where ρil ∈ Z is the randomness from
sensor il and Jl ∈ {1, · · · ,K}hl is the history of encoding
functions used by sensor il so far. If il is a traitor, however,
it may choose Il based on Wn and it may have any amount
of access to previous transmissions I1, · · · , Il−1 and polling
history i1, · · · , il−1 and j1, · · · , jl−1. But, it does not have
access to the randomness ρi for any honest sensor i. Note
again that the amount of traitor eavesdropping ability has no
effect on achievable rates.
After the decoder receives Il, if l < L it uses I1, · · · , Il to
choose the next sensor il+1 and its encoding function index
6jl+1. After the Lth transaction, it decodes according to the
decoding function
g :
L∏
l=1
{1, · · · , 2nRil,jl } → Xn1 × · · · × X
n
m.
Note that we impose no restriction whatsoever on the size
of the total number of transactions L. Thus, a code could
have arbitrary complexity in terms of the number of messages
passed between the sensors and the decoder. However, in
our below definition of achievability, we require that the
communication rate from sensors to decoder always exceeds
that from decoder to sensors. Therefore while the number
of messages may be very large, the amount of feedback is
dinimishingly small.
C. Variable-Rate Problem Statement and Main Result
Let H ⊂ M be the set of honest sensors. Define the
probability of error
Pe , Pr
(
XnH 6= Xˆ
n
H
)
where (Xˆn1 , · · · , Xˆnm) = g(I1, · · · , IL). The probability of
error will in general depend on the actions of the traitors.
Note again that we only require small probability of error on
the source estimates corresponding to the honest sensors.
We define a rate function R(H, r) defined for H ∈ H and
r ∈ R(H) to be α-achievable if there exists a code such that,
for all pairs (H, r) and any choice of actions by the traitors,
Pe ≤ α,
Pr
( L∑
l=1
Ril,jl ≤ R(H, r)
)
≥ 1− α
and logK ≤ αnRi,j for all i, j. This last condition requires, as
discussed above, that the feedback rate from the decoder back
to the sensors is arbitrarily small compared to the forward rate.
A rate function R(H, r) is achievable if for all α > 0, there
is a sequence of α-achievable rate functions {R′k(H, r)}∞k=1
such that
lim
k→∞
R′k(H, r) = R(H, r).
Note that we do not require uniform convergence.
The following definitions allow us to state our main
variable-rate result. For any H ∈ H and r ∈ R(H), let
r˜(w|xH) ,
∑
xHc∈XHc
p(xHc |xH)r(w|xHxHc).
The extent to which W provides information about XHc is
irrelevant to the traitors, since all that really matters to the
traitors is generating information that appears to agree with
XH as reported by the honest sensors. Thus it will usually be
more convenient to work with r˜ rather than r. For any S ∈ H
and r′ ∈ R(S), let
QS,r′ ,
{
p(xS)
∑
w
r˜′(w|xS)q¯(xSc |w) : ∀q¯(xSc |w)
}
.
If Sc were the traitors and W were distributed according to r′,
QS,r′ is the set of distributions q to which the traitors would
have access. That is, if they simulate the proper q¯(xSc |w) from
their received W and combine the result with the actual value
of xS, the combination is distributed according to q. For any
V ⊂ H , define
Q(V ) ,
⋂
S∈V
⋃
r′∈R(S)
QS,r′ .
That is, for some distribution q ∈ Q(V ), for every S ∈ V ,
if the traitors were Sc, they would have access to q for some
r′ ∈ R(S). Thus any distribution in Q(V ) makes it look to the
decoder like any S ∈ V could be the set of honest sensors, so
any sensor in U(V ) ,
⋃
S∈V S is potentially honest.
Theorem 1: A rate function R(H, r) is achievable if and
only if, for all (H, r),
R(H, r) ≥ R∗(H, r) , sup
V ⊂H , q∈QH,r∩Q(V )
Hq(XU(V )).
(8)
See Section V for the proof.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE VARIABLE-RATE REGION
It might at first appear that (9) does not agree with (4).
We discuss several ways in which (8) and (9) can be made
more manageable, particularly in the case of perfect traitor
information, and show that the two are in fact identical. Let
R∗ be the minimum rate achievable over all H ∈ H and
r ∈ R(H). Thus by (8), we can write
R∗ = sup
H∈H ,r∈R(H)
R∗(H, r) = sup
V ⊂H , q∈Q(V )
Hq(XU(V )).
(9)
This is the quantity that appears in (4). Note also that for
perfect traitor information,
QS,r′ = {q(xM) : q(xS) = p(xS)}. (10)
This means that QH,r ∩ Q(V ) = Q(V ∪ {H}). Therefore (8)
becomes
R∗(H, r) = sup
V ⊂H :H∈V , q∈Q(V )
Hq(XU(V )).
The following lemma simplifies calculation of expressions of
the form supq∈Q(V )Hq(XU(V )).
Lemma 1: Suppose the traitors have perfect information.
For any V ⊂ H , the expression
sup
q∈Q(V )
Hq(XU(V )) (11)
is maximized by a q satisfying (10) for all S ∈ V such that,
for some set of functions {σS}S∈V ,
q(x1 · · ·xm) =
∏
S∈V
σS(xS). (12)
Proof: By (10), we need to maximize Hq(XU(V )) subject
to the constraints that for each S ∈ V and all xS ∈ XS,
q(xS) = p(xS). This amounts to maximizing the Lagrangian
Λ = −
∑
xU(V )∈XU(V )
q(xU(V )) log q(xU(V ))
+
∑
S∈V
∑
xS∈XS
λS(xS)
(
q(xS)− p(xS)
)
.
7Note that for any S ⊂ U(V ),
∂q(xS)
∂q(xU(V ))
= 1.
Thus, differentiating with respect to q(xU(V )) gives, assuming
the log is a natural logarithm,
∂Λ
∂q(xU(V ))
=− log q(xU(V ))− 1 +
∑
S∈V
λS(xS).
Setting this to 0 gives
q(xU(V )) = exp
(
−1+
∑
S∈V
λS(xS)
)
= |XU(V )c |
∏
S∈V
σS(xS)
for some set of functions {σS}S∈V . Therefore setting
q(x1 · · ·xm) =
q(xU(V ))
|XU(V )c |
satisfies (12), so if σS are such that (10) is satisfied for all
S ∈ V , q will maximize Hq(XU(V )).
Suppose m = 3 and H = H1. If V = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}},
then q˜(x1x2x3) = p(x1x2)p(x3|x2) is in Q(V ) and by
Lemma 1 maximizes Hq(X1X2X3) over all q ∈ Q(V ). Thus
sup
q∈Q(V )
Hq(X1X2X3) = Hq˜(X1X2X3)
= H(X1X2X3) + I(X1;X3|X2).
By similar reasoning, considering V = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}} and
V = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}} results in (4). Note that if V1 ⊂ V2, then
Q(V1) ⊃ Q(V2), so V2 need not be considered in evaluating
(8). Thus we have ignored larger subsets of H1, since the
value they give would be no greater than the others.
We can generalize to any collection V of the form
{{S1, S2}, {S1, S3}, · · · , {S1, Sk}}, in which case
sup
q∈Q(V )
= H(XS1XS2) +H(XS3 |XS1) + · · ·+H(XSk |XS1).
Employing this, we can rewrite (9) for H = Ht and certain
values of t. For t = 1, it becomes
R∗ = H(X1 · · ·Xm) + max
i,i′∈M
I(Xi;Xi′ |X{i,i′}c).
Again, relative to the Slepian-Wolf result, we always pay a
conditional mutual information penalty for a single traitor. For
t = 2,
R∗ = H(X1 · · ·Xm)
+ max
{
max
S,S′⊂M:|S|=|S′|=2
I(XS;XS′ |X(S∪S′)c),
max
i,i′,i′′∈M
I(Xi;Xi′ ;Xi′′ |X{i,i′,i′′}c)
}
where I(X ;Y ;Z|W ) = H(X |W ) +H(Y |W ) +H(Z|W )−
H(XY Z|W ). For t = m− 1, R∗ is given by (2). There is a
similar formulation for t = m− 2, though it is more difficult
to write down for arbitrary m.
With all these expressions made up of nothing but entropies
and mutual informations, it might seem hopeful that (11)
can be reduced to such an analytic expression for all V .
However, this is not the case. For example, consider V =
{{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, {5, 6, 1}}. This V is irreducible in the
sense that there is no subset V ′ that still satisfies U(V ′) =
{1, · · · , 6}, but there is no simple distribution q ∈ Q(V ) made
up of marginals of p that satisfies Lemma 1, so it must be
found numerically. Still, Lemma 1 simplifies the calculation
considerably.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Converse
We first show the converse. Fix H ∈ H and r ∈ R(H).
Take any V ⊂ H , and any distribution q ∈ QH,r ∩ Q(V ).
Since q ∈ QH,r, there is some q¯(xT |w) such that XH and
XT are distributed according to q. Since also q ∈ QS,r′ for all
S ∈ V and some r′ ∈ R(S), if the traitors simulate this q¯ and
act honestly with these fabricated source values, the decoder
will not be able to determine which of the sets in V is the
actual set of honest sensors. Thus, the decoder must perfectly
decode the sources from all sensors in U(V ), so if R(H, r) is a
precisely α-achievable rate function, R(H, r) ≥ Hq(XU(V )).
B. Achievability Preliminaries
Now we prove achievability. To do so, we will first need
the theory of types. Given yn ∈ Yn, let t(yn) be the type
of yn. Given a type t with denominator n, let Λnt (Y ) be the
set of all sequences in Yn with type t. If t is a joint y, z
type with denominator n, then let Λnt (Y |zn) be the set of
sequences yn ∈ Yn such that (ynzn) have joint type t, with
the convention that this set is empty if the type of zn is not
the marginal of t.
We will also need the following definitions. Given a distri-
bution q on an alphabet Y, define the η-ball of distributions
Bη(q) ,
{
q′(Y) : ∀x ∈ Y : |q(x) − q′(x)| ≤
η
|Y|
}
.
Note that the typical set can be written
T nǫ (X) = {x
n : t(xn) ∈ Bǫ(p)}.
We define slightly modified versions of the sets of distributions
from Section III-C as follows:
Q˘
η
s,r′ ,
⋃
q∈Qs,r′
Bη(q),
Q˘η(V ) ,
⋂
S∈V
⋃
r′∈R(S)
Q˘
η
S,r′ .
Finally, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Given an arbitrary n length distribution qn(xn)
and a type t with denominator n on X, let qi(x) be the marginal
distribution of qn at time i and q¯(x) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 qi(x). If Xn
is distributed according to qn and Pr(Xn ∈ Λnt (X)) ≥ 2−nζ ,
then D(t‖q¯) ≤ ζ.
Proof: Fix an integer n˜. For i˜ = 1, · · · , n˜, let Xn(˜i)
be independently generated from qn. Let Γ be the set of
types tn on supersymbols in Xn with denominator n˜ such
that tn(xn) = 0 if xn 6∈ Λnt (X). Note that
|Γ| ≤ (n˜+ 1)|X|
n
.
8If Xnn˜ = (Xn(1), · · · , Xn(n˜)), then
Pr
(
Xnn˜ ∈
⋃
tn∈Γ
Λn˜tn(X
n)
)
= Pr(Xn(˜i) ∈ Λnt (X), ∀i˜)
≥ 2−nn˜ζ .
But
Pr
(
Xnn˜ ∈
⋃
tn∈Tn
Λn˜tn(X
n)
)
=
∑
tn∈Γ
Pr(Xnn˜ ∈ Λn˜tn(X
n)
≤
∑
tn∈Γ
2−n˜D(t
n‖qn)
≤ (n˜+ 1)|X|
n
2−n˜mintn∈ΓD(t
n‖qn).
For any tn ∈ Γ, letting ti be the marginal type at time i gives
1
n
∑n
i=1 ti = t. Therefore
ζ +
1
nn˜
|X|n log(n˜+ 1) ≥ min
tn∈Γ
1
n
D(tn‖qn)
≥ min
tn∈Γ
1
n
n∑
i=1
D(ti‖qi) (13)
≥ D(t‖q¯) (14)
where (13) holds by [13, Lemma 4.3] and (14) by convexity
of the Kullback-Leibler distance in both arguments. Letting n˜
grow proves the lemma.
The achievability proof proceeds as follows. Section V-C
describes our proposed coding scheme for the case that traitors
cannot eavesdrop. In Section V-D, we demonstrate that this
coding scheme achieves small probability of error when the
traitors have perfect information. Section V-E shows that
the coding scheme achieves the rate function R∗(H, r). In
Section V-F, we extend the proof to include the case that
the traitors have imperfect information. Finally, Section V-G
gives a modification to the coding scheme that can handle
eavesdropping traitors.
C. Coding Scheme Procedure
1) Random Code Structure: Fix ǫ > 0. The codebook for
sensor i is composed of CJi separate encoding functions,
where Ji =
⌈
log |Xi|
ǫ
⌉
and C is an integer to be defined later.
In particular, for i = 1, · · · ,m and c = 1, · · · , C, let
f˜i,c,1 : X
n
i → {1, · · · , 2
n(ǫ+ν)},
f˜i,c,j : X
n
i → {1, · · · , 2
nǫ}, j = 2, · · · , Ji
with ν to defined later. We put tildes on these functions to
distinguish them from the fs defined in (7). The f˜s that
we define here are functions we use as pieces of the overall
encoding functions f . Each one is constructed by a uniform
random binning procedure. For a given i and c, one can think
of {f˜i,c,j}j as a subcodebook that associates each xni ∈ Xni
with a long sequence of bits split into blocks of length n(ǫ+ν)
or nǫ. Define composite functions
F˜i,c,j(x
n
i ) = (f˜i,c,1(x
n
i ), · · · , f˜i,c,j(x
n
i )).
We can think of F˜i,c,j(xni ) as an index of one of 2n(jǫ+ν)
random bins.
2) Round Method: We propose a coding scheme made up
of N rounds, with each round composed of m phases. In the
ith phase, transactions are made entirely with sensor i. We
denote xni (I) as the Ith block of n source values, but for
convenience, we will not include the index I when it is clear
from context. As in the three-sensor example, all transactions
in the Ith round are based only on XnM(I). Thus the total
block length is Nn.
The procedure for each round is identical except for the
variable V (I) maintained by the decoder. This represents the
collection of sets that could be the set of honest sensors based
on information the decoder has received as of the beginning
of round I . The decoder begins by setting V (1) = H and
then pares it down at the end of each round based on new
information.
3) Encoding and Decoding Rules: In the ith phase, if i ∈
U(V (I)), the decoder makes a number of transactions with
sensor i and produces an estimate Xˆni of Xni . The estimate
Xˆni is of course a random variable, so as usual the lower case
xˆni refers to a realization of this variable. If i 6∈ U(V (I)), then
the decoder has determined that sensor i cannot be honest, so
it does not communicate with it and sets xˆni to a null value.
For i ∈ U(V (I)), at the beginning of phase i, sensor i
randomly selects a c ∈ {1, · · · , C}. In the first transaction,
sensor i transmits (c, f˜i,c,1(Xni )). As the phase continues, in
the jth transaction, sensor i transmits f˜i,c,j(Xni ).
After each transaction, the decoder decides whether to ask
for another transaction based on the following rubric. For any
s ⊂M and xˆns ∈ Xns , let
Tj(xˆ
n
s ) , {x
n
i : Ht(xˆns xni )(Xi|Xs) ≤ jǫ}.
Note that
|Tj(xˆ
n
s )| ≤ (n+ 1)
|Xi×Xs|2njǫ.
Let si , {1, · · · , i} ∩ U(V ) and xˆnsi−1 be the previously
decoded source sequences in this round. After j transactions,
the decoder will choose to do another transaction if there are
no sequences in Tj(xˆsi−1 ) matching the received value of
F˜i,c,j . If there is at least one such sequence, let xˆni be one
such sequence. If there are several, the decoder chooses from
among them arbitrarily.
4) Round Conclusion: At the end of round I , the decoder
produces V (I + 1) by setting
V (I +1) =
{
S ∈ V (I) : t(xˆnU(V (I))) ∈
⋃
r′∈R(S)
Q˘
η
S,r′
}
(15)
for η to be defined such that η ≥ ǫ and η → 0 as ǫ→ 0.
D. Error Probability
Define the following error events:
E1(I, i) , {Xˆ
n
i (I) 6= X
n
i (I)},
E2(I) , {H 6∈ V (I)},
E3(I) , {t(Xˆ
n
U(V )(I)) 6∈ Q˘
η
H,r}\
⋃
i∈H
E1(I, i).
9The total probability of error is
Pe = Pr
(
n⋃
I=1
⋃
i∈H
E1(I, i)
)
.
For any sequence of events A0,A1, · · · ,AN with AI ⊂ AI+1
and Pr(A0) = 0,
Pr(AN ) = 1−
N∏
I=1
Pr(AcI)
Pr(AcI−1)
= 1−
N∏
I=1
(1− Pr(AI |A
c
I−1))
≤
N∑
I=1
Pr(AI |A
c
I−1).
Set AI = E2(I + 1) ∪
⋃
i∈H E1(1, i) ∪ · · · ∪ E1(I, i). This
satisfies the conditions, and since XˆnM(I − 1) → V (I) →
XˆnM(I) is a Markov chain,
Pr(AI |A
c
I−1) = Pr
(
E2(I + 1) ∪
⋃
i∈H
E1(I, i)
∣∣∣Ec2(I)).
Therefore
Pe ≤
N∑
I=1
Pr
(
E2(I + 1) ∪
⋃
i∈H
E1(I, i)
∣∣∣Ec2(I)).
If H ∈ V (I) and t(Xˆn
U(V )(I)) ∈ Q˘
η
H,r, then H ∈ V (I + 1).
Thus
E2(I + 1)\E
c
2(I) ⊂ {t(Xˆ
n
U(V )(I)) 6∈ Q˘
η
H,r}\E
c
2(I)
⊂
(
E3(I) ∪
⋃
i∈H
E1(I, i)
)
\Ec2(I)
so
Pe ≤
N∑
I=1
Pr
(
E3(I) ∪
⋃
i∈H
E1(I, i)
∣∣∣Ec2(I))
≤
N∑
I=1
Pr(E3(I)|E
c
2(I)) +
N∑
I=1
∑
i∈H
Pr(E1(I, i)|E
c
2(I)).
(16)
We will show that for any I ,
Pr(E3(I)|E
c
2(I)) ≤
α
2N
. (17)
If the traitors receive perfect source information, then
E3(I) ⊂ {Xˆ
n
H(I) 6∈ T
n
ǫ (XH)} ∩ {Xˆ
n
i (I) = X
n
i (I), ∀i ∈ H}
⊂ {XnH(I) 6∈ T
n
ǫ (XH)}
meaning (17) holds for sufficiently large n. Thus (17) is only
nontrivial if the traitors receive imperfect source information.
This case is dealt with in Section V-F.
Now consider Pr(E1(I, i)|Ec2(I)) for honest i. Conditioning
on Ec2(I) ensures that i ∈ U(V (I)) for honest i, so Xˆni (I)
will be non-null. The only remaining way to make an error
on Xni is if there is some transaction j for which there is a
sequence x′ni ∈ Tj(Xˆnsi−1) such that x
′n
i 6= X
′n
i and F˜i,c,j has
the same value for Xni and x′ni . However, si−1 may contain
traitors. Indeed, it may be made entirely of traitors. Thus, we
have to take into account that Xˆnsi−1 may be chosen to ensure
the existence of such an erroneous x′ni .
Let
k1(x
n
i , xˆ
n
si−1
) , |{c : ∃j, x′ni ∈ Tj(xˆ
n
si−1
)\{xni } :
Fi,c,j(x
′n
i ) = Fi,c,j(x
n
i )}|.
That is, k1 is the number of subcodebooks that if chosen could
cause an error. Recall that sensor i chooses the subcodebook
randomly from the uniform distribution. Thus, given xni and
xˆnsi−1 , the probability of an error resulting from a bad choice
of subcodebook is k1(xni , xˆnsi−1)/C. Furthermore, k1 is based
strictly on the codebook, we can think of k1 as a random
variable based on the codebook choice. Averaging over all
possible codebooks,
Pr(E1(I, i)|E
c
2(I)) ≤ E
∑
xn
i
∈Xn
i
p(xni ) max
xˆnsi−1
∈Xnsi−1
k1(x
n
i , xˆ
n
si−1
)
C
where the expectation is taken over all codebooks.
Let C be the set of all codebooks. We define a subset C1,
and show that the probability of error can be easily bounded
for any codebook in C\C1, and the probability of a codebook
being chosen in C1 is small. In particular, let C1 be the set of
codebooks for which, for any xni ∈ Xni and xˆnsi−1 ∈ X
n
si−1
,
k1(x
n
i , xˆ
n
si−1
) > B, for an integer B ≤ C to be defined later.
Then
Pr(E1(I, i)|E
c
2(I)) ≤ Pr(C\C1)
∑
xn
i
∈Xn
i
p(xni ) max
xˆnsi−1
∈Xnsi−1
B
C
+ Pr(C1)
∑
xn
i
∈Xn
i
p(xni ) max
xˆnsi−1
∈Xnsi−1
C
C
≤
B
C
+ Pr(C1). (18)
Since each subcodebook is generated identically, k1 is a
binomial random variable with C trials and probability of
success
P , Pr
(
∃j, x′ni ∈ Tj(xˆ
n
si−1
)\{xni } : Fi,c,j(x
′n
i ) = Fi,c,j(x
n
i )
)
≤
∑
j
∑
x′n
i
∈Tj(xˆnsi−1
)\{xn
i
}
Pr
(
Fi,c,j(x
′n
i ) = Fi,c,j(x
n
i )
)
≤ Ji
∣∣∣Tj(xˆnsi−1 )∣∣∣ 2−n(jǫ+ν)
≤ Ji(n+ 1)
|Xi×Xsi−1 |2−nν ≤ 2n(ǫ−ν)
for sufficiently large n. For a binomial random variable X
with mean X¯ and any κ, we can use the Chernoff bound to
write
Pr(X ≥ κ) ≤
(
eX¯
κ
)κ
. (19)
Therefore
Pr(k1(x
n
i , xˆ
n
si−1
) > B) ≤
(
eCP
B + 1
)B+1
≤ 2nB(ǫ−ν)
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if ν > ǫ and n is sufficiently large. Thus
Pr(C1) = Pr(∃x
n
i , xˆ
n
si−1
: k1(x
n
i , xˆ
n
si−1
) > B)
≤
∑
xn
i
∑
xˆnsi−1
Pr(k(xni , xˆ
n
si−1
) > B)
≤
∑
xn
i
∑
xˆnsi−1
2nB(ǫ−ν)
= 2n(log |Xi|+log |Xsi−1 |+B(ǫ−ν). (20)
Combining (16) with (17), (18), and (20) gives
Pe ≤
α
2
+
N∑
I=1
∑
i∈H
(
B
C
+ 2n(log |Xi|+log |Xsi−1 |+B(ǫ−ν)
)
≤
α
2
+Nm
(
B
C
+ 2n(log |XM|+B(ǫ−ν))
)
which is less than α for sufficiently large n if
B >
log |XM|
ν − ǫ
and
C ≥
3NmB
α
>
3Nm log |XM|
α(ν − ǫ)
.
E. Code Rate
The discussion above placed a lower bound on C. However,
for sufficiently large n, we can make 1
n
logC ≤ ǫ, meaning it
takes no more than ǫ rate to transmit the subcodebook index
c. Therefore the rate for phase i is at most (j+1)ǫ+ν, where
j is the number of transactions in phase i. Transaction j must
be the earliest one with xˆni ∈ Tj(xˆsi−1 ), otherwise it would
have been decoded earlier. Thus j is the smallest integer for
which
Ht(xˆnsi−1 xˆ
n
i
)(Xi|Xsi−1) ≤ jǫ
meaning
jǫ ≤ Ht(xˆnsi−1 xˆ
n
i
)(Xi|Xsi−1) + ǫ.
By (15), for all s ∈ V (I + 1), t(xˆn
U(V (I))) ∈
⋃
r′∈R(s) Q˘
η
s,r′ ,
meaning
t(xˆU(V (I))) ∈
⋂
s∈V (I+1)
⋃
r′∈R(s)
Q˘
η
s,r′ = Q˘
η(V (I + 1)). (21)
Combining this with (17), with probability at least 1 − α,
t(xˆU(V (I))) ∈ Q˘
η
H,r ∩ Q˘
η(V (I + 1)). Therefore with high
probability the rate for all of round I is at most∑
i∈U(V (I))
(
Ht(xˆnsi−1 xˆ
n
i
)(Xi|Xsi−1) + 2ǫ+ ν
)
≤ Ht(xˆU(V (I)))
(
XU(V )
)
+m(2ǫ+ ν)
≤ sup
q∈Q˘η
H,r
∩Q˘η(V (I+1))
Hq
(
XU(V )
)
+m(2ǫ+ ν)
≤ sup
q∈Q˘η
H,r
∩Q˘η(V (I+1))
Hq
(
XU(V (I+1))
)
+ log
∣∣XU(V (I))\U(V (I+1))∣∣+m(2ǫ+ ν)
≤ sup
V ⊂H , q∈Q˘η
H,r
∩Q˘η(V )
Hq(XU(V ))
+ log
∣∣XU(V (I))\U(V (I+1))∣∣+m(2ǫ+ ν). (22)
Whenever U(V (I))\U(V (I + 1)) 6= ∅, at least one sensor is
eliminated. Therefore the second term in (22) will be nonzero
in all but at most m rounds. Moreover, although we have
needed to bound ν from below, we can still choose it such
that ν → 0 as ǫ → 0. Thus if N is large enough, the rate
averaged over all rounds is no more than
Rǫ(H, r) , sup
V ⊂H , q∈Q˘η
H,r
∩Q˘η(V )
Hq(XU(V )) + ǫ˙
where ǫ˙ → 0 as ǫ → 0. This is a precisely α-achievable rate
function. By continuity of entropy,
lim
ǫ→0
Rǫ(H, r) = sup
V ⊂H , q∈QH,r∩Q(V )
Hq(XU(V )) = R
∗(H, r)
so R∗(H, r) is achievable.
F. Imperfect Traitor Information
We now consider the case that the traitors have access
to imperfect information about the sources. The additional
required piece of analysis is to prove (17). That is
Pr(t(XˆnU(V (I))(I)) 6∈ Q˘
η
H,r, xˆH = XH|H ∈ V (I)) ≤
α
2N
.
We will in fact prove the slightly stronger statement
Pr(t(XnH∩U(V (I))(I)Xˆ
n
T∩U(V (I))(I)) 6∈ Q˘
η
H,r|H ∈ V (I))
≤
α
2N
. (23)
Since we condition on H ∈ V (I), we can assume H ⊂
U(V (I)). For notational convenience, let Y = XH(I) and
Z = XT∩U(V (I))(I), so (23) becomes
Pr(t(Y nZˆn) 6∈ Q˘η
H,r|H ∈ V (I)) ≤
α
2N
.
Based on their received value of Wn, the traitors choose a
value of c and then a series of messages for each traitor in
U(V (I)). The number of messages each traitor actually gets to
send depends on how long it takes for the decoder to construct
a source estimate. Let j = {ji}i∈T∩U(V (I)) be a vector
representing the number of transactions that take place with
each traitor in U(V (I)). There are JT ,
∏
i∈T∩U(V (I)) Ji
different possible values of j. We can think of any series
of values of c and messages as a bin (i.e. a subset Zn);
that is, all sequences that map to the same messages in the
subcodebooks denoted by the values of c. Let R(j) be the
rate at which the traitors transmit given j. Thus if we let BR
be the set of all bins in the codebook constructed at rate R,
the traitors are equivalent to a group of potentially random
functions gj : Wn → BR(j).
Consider a joint y, z type t. In order for (Y nzˆn) to have
type t for a given j, we need R(j) ≥ Ht(Z|Y ) + ν. Thus
Pr((Y nzˆn) ∈ Λnt (Y Z)) ≤ Pr(∃j : R(j) ≥ Ht(Z|Y ) + ν,
zn ∈ gj(W
n) ∩ Λnt (Z|Y
n)).
Let δ , ǫ4N ,
δt,j , Pr((Y
n,Wn) ∈ T nǫ (YW ),
∃zn ∈ gj(W
n) ∩ Λnt (Z|Y
n))
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and
P ,
{
t : max
j:R(j)≥Ht(Z|Y )+ν
δt,j ≥
δ
(n+ 1)|Y×Z|JT
}
.
We will show that P ⊂ Q˘η
H,r, so that
Pr(t(Y nzˆn) 6∈ Q˘H,r|H ∈ V (I))
≤ Pr(t(Y nzˆn) 6∈ P|H ∈ V (I))
≤ Pr
(
∃t ∈ Pc, j : R(j) ≥ Ht(Z|Y ) + ν,
zn ∈ gj(W
n) ∩ Λnt (Z|Y
n)
∣∣H ∈ V (I))
≤ Pr((Y n,Wn) 6∈ T nǫ (YW )) +
∑
t∈Pc
∑
j:R(j)≥Ht(Z|Y )+ν
δt,j
≤ δ + (n+ 1)|Y×Z|JT
δ
(n+ 1)|Y×Z|JT
= 2δ =
α
2N
for sufficiently large n.
Fix t ∈ P. There is some j with R(j) ≥ Ht(Z|Y ) + ν
and δt,j ≥ δ(n+1)|Y×Z|JT . Any random gj is a probabilistic
combination of a number of deterministic functions, so if this
lower bound on δt,j holds for a random gj, it must also hold
for some deterministic gj. Therefore we do not lose generality
to assume from now on that gj is deterministic. We also drop
the j subscript for convenience. Our method of proof will be
to demonstrate that such a functions g can only exist if there
is also a h : Wn → Zn with almost the same properties.
That is, if the traitors can fabricate a counterfeit bin made up
of source sequences, they can fabricate a single counterfeit
source sequence contained in this bin that works nearly as
well.
Define the following sets:
Anǫ (Y |w
n) , {yn ∈ T nǫ (Y |w
n) :
∃zn ∈ g(wn) ∩ Λnt (Z|y
n)},
Anǫ (W ) ,
{
wn ∈ T nǫ (W ) :
Pr(Y n ∈ Anǫ (Y |w
n)|Wn = wn) ≥
δ
2(n+ 1)|Y×Z|JT
}
.
Applying the definitions of P and δt,j gives
δ
(n+ 1)|Y×Z|JT
≤ Pr((Y nWn) ∈ T nǫ (YW ) : ∃z
n ∈ g(Wn) ∩ Λnt (Z|Y
n))
=
∑
wn∈Tnǫ (W )
p(wn) Pr(Y n ∈ Anǫ (Y |w
n)|Wn = wn)
≤ Pr(Wn ∈ Anǫ (W )) +
δ
2(n+ 1)|Y×Z|JT
meaning Pr(Wn ∈ Anǫ (W )) ≥ δ2(n+1)|Y×Z|JT . Fix w
n ∈
Anǫ (W ). Since Anǫ (Y |wn) ⊂ T nǫ (Y |wn),
|Anǫ (Y |w
n)| ≥
δ
2(n+ 1)|Y×Z|JT
2n(H(Y |W )−ǫ).
Note also that
|Anǫ (Y |w
n)| ≤
∑
yn∈Tnǫ (Y |w
n)
|g(wn) ∩ Λnt (Z|y
n)|
=
∑
zn∈g(wn)
|Λnt (Y |z
n) ∩ T nǫ (Y |w
n)|.
Setting k2(zn, wn) , |Λnt (Y |zn) ∩ T nǫ (Y |wn)|,∑
zn∈g(wn)
k2(z
n, wn) ≥
δ
2(n+ 1)|Y×Z|JT
2n(H(Y |W )−ǫ)
≥ 2n(H(Y |W )−2ǫ) (24)
for sufficiently large n. We will show that there is actually
a single z˜n ∈ g(wn) such that k2(z˜n, wn) represents a large
portion of the above sum, so z˜n itself is almost as good as the
entire bin. Then setting h(wn) = z˜n will give us the properties
we need. Note that∑
zn∈Zn
k2(z
n, wn) =
∑
yn∈Tnǫ (Y |w
n)
|Λnt (Z|y
n)|
≤ 2n(H(Y |W )+Ht(Z|Y )+ǫ). (25)
Certainly
k2(z
n, wn) ≤ |T nǫ (Y |w
n)| ≤ 2n(H(Y |W )+ǫ)
so if we let l(zn) be the integer such that
2n(H(Y |W )−l(z
n)ǫ) < k2(z
n, wn)
≤ 2n(H(Y |W )−(l(z
n)−1)ǫ). (26)
then l(zn) ≥ 0. Furthermore, if k2(zn, wn) > 0, then l(zn) ≤
L , ⌈H(Y |W )
ǫ
⌉. Let M(l) = |{zn ∈ Zn : l(zn) = l}|. Then
from (25), for some l,
2n(H(Y |W )+Ht(Z|Y )+ǫ) ≥
∑
zn∈Zn
k2(z
n, wn)
≥
∑
zn∈Zn:l(zn)=l
k2(z
n, wn)
≥M(l)2n(H(Y |W )−lǫ)
giving
M(l) ≤ 2n(Ht(Z|Y )+(l+1)ǫ).
For any bin b ∈ BR(j), let M˜(l, b) , |{zn ∈ b : l(zn) = l}|.
Since R(j) ≥ Ht(Z|Y ) + ν, M˜(l, b) is a binomial random
variable with M(l) trials and probability of success at most
2−n(Ht(Z|Y )+ν). Thus
EM˜(l, b) ≤ 2n(Ht(Z|Y )+(l+1)ǫ)2−n(Ht(Z|Y )+ν)
= 2n((l+1)ǫ−ν).
Let C2 be the set of codebooks such that for any group of
sensors, subcodebooks, type t, transactions j, sequence wn ∈
Wn, bin b and integer l, either M˜(l, b) ≥ 2nǫ if (l+1)ǫ−ν ≤ 0
or M˜(l, b) ≥ 2n((l+2)ǫ−ν) if (l + 1)ǫ − ν > 0. We will show
that the probability of C2 is small, so we may disregard it.
Again using (19), if (l + 1)ǫ− ν ≤ 0,
Pr(M˜(l, b) ≥ 2nǫ) ≤
( e
2n(−lǫ+ν)
)2nǫ
≤ 2−2
nǫ
and if (l + 1)ǫ− ν > 0,
Pr(M˜(l, b) ≥ 2n((l+2)ǫ−ν)) ≤
( e
2nǫ
)2n((l+2)ǫ−ν)
≤ 2−2
n((l+2)ǫ−ν)
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both for sufficiently large n. Therefore
Pr(C2) ≤ 2
mCm(n+ 1)|XM|J1 · · · Jm|W|
n2n(|XM|+ν)
·

 ∑
0≤l≤ ν
ǫ
−1
2−2
nǫ
+
∑
ν
ǫ
−1<l≤L
2−2
n((l+2)ǫ−ν)


which vanishes as n grows.
We assume from now on that the codebook is not in C2,
meaning in particular that M˜(l, g(wn)) ≤ 2nǫ for (l+1)ǫ−ν ≤
0 and M˜(l, g(wn)) ≤ 2n((l+2)ǫ−ν) for (l + 1)ǫ − ν > 0.
Applying these and (26) to (24) and letting l˜ be an integer
defined later,
2−n2ǫ ≤ 2−nH(Y |W )
∑
zn∈g(wn)
k2(z
n, wn)
≤
L∑
l=0
M˜(l, g(wn))2−n(l−1)ǫ
=
∑
0≤l<l˜
M˜(l, g(wn))2−n(l−1)ǫ
+
∑
l˜≤l≤ ν
ǫ
−1
M˜(l, g(wn))2−n(l−1)ǫ
+
∑
ν
ǫ
−1<l≤L
M˜(l, g(wn))2−n(l−1)ǫ
≤
∑
0≤l<l˜
M˜(l, g(wn))2nǫ +
∑
l˜≤l≤ ν
ǫ
−1
2nǫ2−n(l˜−1)ǫ
+
∑
ν
ǫ
−1<l≤L
2n((l+2)ǫ−ν)2−n(l−1)ǫ
≤
∑
0≤l<l˜
M˜(l, g(wn))2nǫ + L2n(−l˜+2)ǫ + L2n(3ǫ−ν).
Therefore∑
0≤l<l˜
M˜(l, g(wn)) ≥ 2−n3ǫ
(
1− L2n(−l˜+4)ǫ − L2n(5ǫ−ν)
)
.
Setting l˜ = 5 and ν > 5ǫ ensures that the right hand side
is positive for sufficiently large n, so there is at least one
zn ∈ g(wn) with |T nǫ (Y |wn) ∩ Λnt (Y |zn)| ≥ 2n(H(Y |W )−4ǫ).
Now we define h : Wn → Zn such that h(wn) is such a zn
for wn ∈ Anǫ (W ) and h(wn) is arbitrary for wn 6∈ Anǫ (W ).
If we let Z˜n = h(Wn),
Pr((Y nZ˜n) ∈ Λnt (Y Z))
≥
∑
wn∈Anǫ (W )
p(wn) Pr(Y n ∈ Λnt (Y |h(w
n))|Wn = wn)
≥
∑
wn∈Anǫ (W )
p(wn)
· Pr(Y n ∈ T nǫ (Y |w
n) ∩ Λnt (Y |h(w
n))|Wn = wn)
≥ Pr(Wn ∈ Anǫ (W ))2
−n(H(Y |W )+ǫ)2n(H(Y |W )−4ǫ)
≥
δ
2(n+ 1)|Y×Z|
2−n5ǫ.
The variables (Y nWnZ˜n) are distributed according to
qn(ynwnzn) =
(
n∏
i=1
p(yi)r(wi|yi)
)
1{zn = h(wn)}.
Let qi(ywz) be the marginal distribution of qn(ynwnzn) at
time i. It factors as
qi(ywz) = p(y)r(w|y)qi(z|w).
Let q¯(yz) , 1
n
∑
i qi(yz) and q¯(z|w) ,
1
n
∑n
i=1 qi(z|w).
Then
q¯(yz) = p(y)
∑
w
r(w|y)q¯(z|w)
so by Lemma 2,
D
(
t
∥∥∥p(y)∑
w
r(w|y)q¯(z|w)
)
≤ −
1
n
log
(
δ
2(n+ 1)|Y×Z|
)
+ 5ǫ.
Therefore t ∈ Q˘η
H,r for sufficiently large n and some η such
that η → 0 as ǫ→ 0.
G. Eavesdropping Traitors
We consider now the case that the traitors are able to
overhear communication between the honest sensors and the
decoder. If the traitors have perfect information, then hearing
the messages sent by honest sensors will not give them any
additional information, so the above coding scheme still works
identically. If the traitors have imperfect information, we need
to slightly modify the coding scheme, but the achievable rates
are the same.
The important observation is that eavesdropping traitors
only have access to messages sent in the past. Thus, by
permuting the order in which sensors are polled in each
round, the effect of the eavesdropping can be eliminated.
In a given round, let H′ be the set of honest sensors that
transmit before any traitor. Since the additional information
gain from eavesdropping will be no more than the values of
XnH′ , the rate for this round, if no sensors are eliminated
(i.e. U(V (I + 1)) = U(V (I))), will be no more than the
rate without eavesdropping when the traitors have access to
W ′n = (Wn, XnH′). The goal of permuting the transmission
order is to find an ordering in which all the traitors transmit
before any of the honest sensors, since then the achieved rate,
if no sensors are eliminated, will be the same as with no
eavesdropping. It is possible to determine when such an order
occurs because it will be the order that produces the smallest
rate.
More specifically, we will alter the transmission order from
round to round in the following way. We always choose an
ordering such that for some S ∈ V , the sensors Sc transmit
before S. We cycle through all such orderings until for each
S, there has been one round with a corresponding ordering in
which no sensors were eliminated. We then choose one S that
never produced a rate larger than the smallest rate encountered
so far. We perform rounds in a order corresponding to S from
then on. If the rate ever changes and is no longer the minimum
rate encountered so far, we choose a different minimizing
S. The minimum rate will always be no greater than the
achievable rate without eavesdropping, so after enough rounds,
we achieve the same average rate.
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VI. FIXED-RATE CODING
Consider an m-tuple of rates (R1, · · · , Rm), encoding func-
tions fi : Xni → {1, · · · , 2nRi} for i ∈ M, and decoding
function
g :
m∏
i=1
{1, · · · , 2nRi} → Xn1 × · · · × X
n
m.
Let Ii ∈ {1, · · · , 2nRi} be the message transmitted by sensor
i. If sensor i is honest, Ii = fi(Xni ). If it is a traitor, it may
choose Ii arbitrarily, based on Wn. Define the probability of
error Pe , Pr
(
XnH 6= Xˆ
n
H
)
where XˆnM = g(I1, · · · , Im).
We say an m-tuple (R1, · · · , Rm) is deterministic-fixed-rate
achievable if for any ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there
exist coding functions fi and g such that, for any choice of
actions by the traitors, Pe ≤ ǫ. Let Rdfr ⊂ Rm be the set of
deterministic-fixed-rate achievable m-tuples.
For randomized fixed-rate coding, the encoding functions
become
fi : X
n
i × Z → {1, · · · , 2
nRi}
where Z is the alphabet for the randomness. If sensor i is
honest, Ii = fi(Xni , ρi), where ρi ∈ Z is the randomness
produced at sensor i. Define an m-tuple to be randomized-
fixed-rate achievable in the same way as above, and Rrfr ⊂ Rm
to be the set of randomized-fixed-rate achievable rate vectors.
For any S ⊂ M, let SW(XS) be the Slepian-Wolf rate region
on the random variables XS. That is,
SW(XS) ,
{
RS : ∀S
′ ⊂ S :
∑
i∈S′
Ri ≥ H(XS′ |XS\S′)
}
.
Let
R∗rfr , {(R1, · · · , Rm) : ∀S ∈ H : RS ∈ SW(XS)},
R∗dfr , {(R1, · · · , Rm) ∈ R
∗
rfr : ∀S1, S2 ∈ H :
if ∃r ∈ R(S2) : Hr(XS1∩S2 |W ) = 0,
then RS1∩S2 ∈ SW(XS1∩S2)}
The following theorem gives the rate regions explicitly.
Theorem 2: The fixed-rate achievable regions are given by
Rdfr = R
∗
dfr and Rrfr = R∗rfr.
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
A. Converse for Randomized Coding
Assume (R1, · · · , Rm) is randomized-fixed-rate achievable.
Fix S ∈ H . Suppose Sc are the traitors and perform a black
hole attack. Thus XˆnS must be based entirely on {fi(Xni )}i∈S,
and since Pr(XS 6= XˆS) can be made arbitrarily small, by the
converse of the Slepian-Wolf theorem, which holds even if the
encoders may use randomness, RS ∈ SW(XS).
B. Converse for Deterministic Coding
Assume (R1, · · · , Rm) is deterministic-fixed-rate achiev-
able. The converse for randomized coding holds equally well
here, so (R1, · · · , Rm) ∈ R∗rfr. We prove by contradiction
that (R1, · · · , Rm) ∈ R∗dfr as well. Suppose (R1, · · · , Rm) ∈
R∗rfr\R
∗
dfr, meaning that for some S1, S2 ∈ H , there exists
r ∈ R(S2) such that Hr(XS1∩S2 |W ) = 0 but RS1∩S2 6∈
SW(XS1∩S2). Consider the case that H = S1 and r is such
that Hr(S1∩H|W ) = 0. Thus the traitors always have access
to XnS1∩H.
For all S ∈ H , let D(XS) be the subset of T nǫ (XS)
such that all sequences in D are decoded correctly if Sc are
the traitors and no matter what messages they send. Thus
the probability that XnS ∈ D(XS) is large. Let D(XS1∩H)
be the marginal intersection of D(XS1) and D(XH). That
is, it is the set of sequences xnS1∩H such that there ex-
ists xn
S1\H
and xn
H\S1
with (xnS1∩Hx
n
S1\H
) ∈ D(XS1) and
(xnS1∩HxH\S1) ∈ D(XH). Note that with high probability
XnS1∩H ∈ D(XS1∩H). Suppose X
n
S1∩H
∈ D(XS1∩H) and
(XnS1∩HX
n
H\S1
) ∈ D(XH), so by the definition of D,
XˆnS1∩H = X
n
S1∩H
. Since RS1∩H 6∈ SW(XS1∩H), there is
some x′nS1∩H ∈ D(XS1∩H) mapping to the same codewords
as XS1∩H such that x′nS1∩H 6= X
n
S1∩H
. Because the traitors
have access to XS1∩H, they can construct x′nS1∩H, and also
find x′n
S1\H
such that (x′nS1∩Hx
′n
S1\H
) ∈ D(XS1). If the traitors
report x′n
S1\H
, then we have a contradiction, since this situation
is identical to that of the traitors being Sc1, in which case, by
the definition of D, XˆnS1∩H = x
′n
S1∩H
.
C. Achievability for Deterministic Coding
Fix (R1, · · · , Rm) ∈ R∗dfr. Our achievability scheme will
be a simple extension of the random binning proof of the
Slepian-Wolf theorem given in [14]. Each encoding function
fi : X
n
i → {1, · · · , 2
nRi} is constructed by means of a random
binning procedure. Decoding is then performed as follows. For
each S ∈ H , if there is at least one xnS ∈ T nǫ (XS) matching
all received codewords from S, let xˆni,S be one such sequence
for all i ∈ s. If there is no such sequence, leave xˆni,S null.
Note that we produce a separate estimate xˆni,S of Xni for all
S ∋ i. Let xˆni equal one non-null xˆni,S.
We now consider the probability of error. With high prob-
ability, xˆni,H = Xni for honest i. Thus all we need to show
is that for all other S ∈ H with i ∈ S, xˆi,S is null or also
equal to Xni . Fix S ∈ H . If there is some r ∈ R(S) with
Hr(XH∩S|W ) = 0, then by the definition of R∗dfr, RH∩S ∈
SW(XH∩S). Thus with high probability the only sequence
xnH∩S ∈ T
n
ǫ (XH∩S) matching all received codewords will be
XnH∩S, so xˆ
n
i,S = X
n
i for all i ∈ H ∩ S.
Now consider the case that Hr(XH∩S|W ) > 0 for all
r ∈ R(S). For convenience, let Y = XH∩S and Z = XT .
Let RY =
∑
i∈H∩SRi and RZ =
∑
i∈T Ri. Since RS ∈
SW(XS), RY + RZ ≥ H(Y Z) + η for some η. Let bY (yn)
be the set of sequences in Yn that map to the same codewords
as yn, and let bZ ⊂ Zn be the set of sequences mapping to
the codewords sent by the traitors. Then Y may be decoded
incorrectly only if there is some y′n ∈ bY (Y n) and some
zn ∈ bZ such that y′n 6= Y n and (y′nzn) ∈ T nǫ (Y Z). For
some wn ∈Wn,
Pr(∃y′n ∈ bY (Y
n)\{Y n}, zn ∈ bZ :
(y′nzn) ∈ T nǫ (Y Z)|W
n = wn)
≤ Pr(Y n 6∈ T nǫ (Y |w
n)|Wn = wn) +
∑
yn∈Tnǫ (Y |w
n)
p(yn|wn)
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· 1{∃y′n ∈ bY (yn)\{yn}, zn ∈ bZ : (y′nzn) ∈ T nǫ (Y Z)}
≤ ǫ+ 2−n(H(Y |W )−ǫ)
∑
zn∈bZ∩Tnǫ (Z)
k3(z
n, wn) (27)
where
k3(z
n, wn) , |{yn ∈ T nǫ (Y |w
n) :
∃y′n ∈ bY (y
n) ∩ T nǫ (Y |z
n)\{yn}}|.
On average, the number of typical yn put into a bin is at
most 2n(H(Y )−RY +ǫ), so we can use (19) to assume with high
probability than no more than 2n(H(Y )−RY +2ǫ) are put into
any bin. Note that∑
zn∈Tnǫ (Z)
k3(z
n, wn)
≤
∑
zn∈Tnǫ (Z)
∑
yn∈Tnǫ (Y |w
n)
|bY (y
n) ∩ T nǫ (Y |z
n)\{yn}|
=
∑
yn∈Tnǫ (Y |w
n)
∑
y′n∈bY (yn)∩Tnǫ (Y |z
n)\{yn}
|T nǫ (Z|y
′n)|
≤ 2n(H(Y |W )+ǫ)2n(H(Y )−RY+2ǫ)2n(H(Z|Y )+ǫ)
= 2n(H(Y Z)+H(Y |W )−RY+4ǫ).
The average k3 sum over typical zn in a given bin is thus
2n(H(Y Z)+H(Y |W )−RY −RZ+4ǫ) ≤ 2n(H(Y |W )+4ǫ−η).
We can use an argument similar to that in Section V-F,
partitioning T nǫ (Z) into different l values, to show that with
high probability, since H(Y |W ) > 0, for all bins bZ ,∑
zn∈Tnǫ (Z)∩bZ
k3(z
n, wn) ≤ 2n(H(Y |W )+5ǫ−η).
Applying this to (27) gives
Pr(∃y′n ∈ bY (Y
n)\{yn}, zn ∈ bZ :
(y′nzn) ∈ T nǫ (Y Z)|W
n = wn) ≤ ǫ + 2n(6ǫ−η).
Letting η > 6ǫ ensures that the probability of error is always
small no matter what bin bZ the traitors choose.
D. Achievability for Randomized Coding
We perform essentially the same coding procedure as with
deterministic coding, expect we also apply randomness in a
similar fashion as with variable-rate coding. The only differ-
ence from the deterministic coding scheme is that each sensor
has a set of C identically created subcodebooks, from which
it randomly chooses one, then sends the chosen subcodebook
index along with the codeword. Decoding is the same as
for deterministic coding. An argument similar to that in
Section V-D can be used to show small probability of error.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We gave an explicit characterization of the region of achiev-
able rates for a Byzantine attack on distributed source coding
with variable-rate codes, deterministic fixed-rate codes, and
randomized fixed-rate codes. We saw that a different set of
rates were achievable for the three cases, and gave converse
proofs and rate achieving coding schemes for each. Variable-
rate achievability was shown using an algorithm in which
sensors use randomness to make it unlikely that the traitors
can fool the coding process.
Much more work could be done in the area of Byzantine
network source coding. Multiterminal rate distortion [15], [16]
could be studied, or other topologies, such as side information.
However, perhaps the biggest drawback in this paper is that, as
we discussed in the introduction, because the traitors cannot in
general be identified, it is difficult to imagine applications that
do not require some post processing of the source estimates,
for example to estimate some underlying process. Thus it
would make sense to solve the coding and estimation problems
simultaneously, such as in the the CEO problem [17].
REFERENCES
[1] D. Slepian and J. Wolf, “Noiseless coding of correlated information
sources,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory, vol. IT-19, pp. 471–480,
1973.
[2] S. Marano, V. Matta, and L. Tong, “Distributed inference in the presence
of Byzantine sensors,” in Proc. 40th Annual Asilomar Conf. on Signals,
Systems, and Computers, (Pacific Grove, CA), Oct 29–Nov 1 2006.
[3] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease, “The byzantine generals prob-
lem,” ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems,
vol. 4, pp. 382–401, July 1982.
[4] D. Dolev, “The Byzantine generals strike again,” Journal of Algorithms,
vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 14–30, 1982.
[5] R. Perlman, Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness. PhD
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, August
1988.
[6] L. Zhou and Z. J. Haas, “Securing ad hoc networks,” IEEE Network
Magazine, vol. 13, pp. 24–30, Nov/Dec 1999.
[7] Y. Hu and A. Perrig, “Security and privacy in sensor networks,” IEEE
Security and Privacy Magazine, vol. 2, pp. 28–39, 2004.
[8] T. Ho, B. Leong, R. Koetter, M. Me´dard, M. Effrons, and D. Karger,
“Byzantine modification detection in multicast networks using random-
ized network coding,” in IEEE Proc. Intl. Sym. Inform. Theory, p. 143,
June 27–July 2 2004.
[9] B. Awerbuch, D. Holmer, C. Nita-Rotaru, and H. Rubens, “An on-
demand secure routing protocol resilient to byzantine failures,” in ACM
Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe), September 2002.
[10] O. Kosut and L. Tong, “Capacity of cooperative fusion in the presence
of Byzantine sensors.” in Proc. 44th Annual Allerton Conf. on Commun.,
Control and Comp., (Monticello, IL), Sep 27–29 2006.
[11] T. H. S. Jaggi, M. Langberg and M. Effros, “Correction of adversarial
errors in networks,” in Proceedings of International Symposium in
Information Theory and its Applications, (Adelaide, Australia), 2005.
[12] A. Wyner, “The wiretap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, pp. 1355–
1387, 1975.
[13] A. Wyner, “The common information of two dependent random wari-
ables,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 21, pp. 163–179, March 1975.
[14] T. M. Cover, “A proof of the data compression theorem of Slepian
and Wolf for ergodic sources,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 21,
pp. 226–228, March 1975.
[15] S. Y. Tung, Multiterminal Source Coding. PhD thesis, Cornell Univer-
sity, Ithaca, NY, 1978.
[16] T. Berger, The Information Theory Approach to Communications (G.
Longo, ed.), chapter Multi-terminal source coding. Springer-Verlag,
1978.
[17] T. Berger, Z. Zhang, and H. Viswanathan, “The CEO problem [multiter-
minal source coding],” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 42, pp. 887–
902, May. 1996.
